

THE U.S. AND THE I.T.U. IN A CHANGING WORLD



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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE / Office of Telecommunications

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OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
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
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- Conducts research needed in the evaluation and development of telecommunication policy as required by the Office of Telecommunications Policy, pursuant to Executive Order 11556

PREFACE

This paper by Professor George A. Coddington, a recognized authority on the International Telecommunication Union, was originally given as an invited talk at the 4th Telecommunications for Government Conference held in Boulder, Colorado, November 11-13, 1975. Due to the many requests for copies of the paper, the Office of Telecommunications is reproducing the talk as an OT Special Publication. I feel this is particularly timely in view of his positions on questions of national interest regarding the ITU which, I believe, have considerable relevance to our preparatory work for the 1979 World General Administrative Conference.

It needs to be stressed that the opinions and statements contained in this paper are those of Professor Coddington, and do not necessarily represent the opinions and policies of the Office of Telecommunications.



Douglass D. Crombie
Director, ITS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
1. POLITICS IN THE ITU	1
2. THE NATURE OF THE ITU	3
3. RECENT CHANGES IN THE ITU'S ENVIRONMENT	4
4. IMPACT OF CHANGE ON ITU	5
5. TOWARD A NEW STRATEGY	8
REFERENCES	14

THE U.S. AND THE I.T.U. IN A CHANGING WORLD

George A. Coddington, Jr.*

When the U.S. architects of the post-World War II sat down to decide what had to be done, an international cooperative effort in the field of telecommunications was given first priority. A conference was called to meet in Atlantic City in 1947 to take the crusty old International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and remodel it to meet the burgeoning postwar needs of the world and the United States in particular. The conference was held and the ITU was remodeled. A great deal of time and effort was expended on the ITU in the years that have followed. In general, the response in the United States was that the ITU is one of the more valuable of the international organizations to which it belonged.

In the past ten years, however, a profound change has taken place. An increasing amount of criticism is being leveled at the ITU, and suggestions have been made that it may even be in the best interests of the United States to withdraw from the ITU. I will give you only two examples. In its report to the Secretary of State, the U.S. delegation to the Torremolinos conference in 1973 stated that too much of the time of the Conference had been spent on matters "that had little to do with the role of the ITU in furthering international telecommunications," which placed in some doubt "the continuing usefulness of the ITU as an international regulatory agency for telecommunications" (Beam et al, 1973, p. 8). In a speech (Lee, 1974) before the International Radio and Television Society in November, 1974, Commissioner Lee of the FCC, a member of the U.S. delegation to the World Maritime Administrative Radio Conference of 1974, stated that the excessive "political" actions of the third world at the Conference should cause the United States "to reassess the suitability of its present role in the ITU," and to "look for an alternative forum to resolve the kind of issues that the ITU was once attuned to handle."

The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of the problem and to suggest some measures which might help to restore the U.S. effectiveness in the ITU, the oldest of the world's international organizations.

1. POLITICS IN THE ITU

Before we get into the heart of the matter, however, we must clear up a few possible misunderstandings which might

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lead us astray. First, this is not a problem that concerns only the ITU. The United States has had difficulties in the International Labour Organization, and on November 6 it was announced that the United States would withdraw from that body. This is the first time in our history we will have withdrawn from an international organization. Recently there have been harsh words and even threats of U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO and the United Nations itself.

Second, despite what Commissioner Lee inferred, there have been politics in the ITU from the very beginning. The ITU dates from 1865, the year that its parent organization, the International Telegraph Union, held its first conference in Paris. Many "political" acts occurred at that conference. For example, the whole idea of having the inaugural conference in Paris was a political act. Keith Clark, in his book International Communications (1931), stated it thusly: "The Emperor Napoleon III, at the height of his imperial glory, and neglecting no means which would centralize the world in France, moved then to secure a European entente by the scarcely visible wires of telegraphic solidarity."

Politics was also present in the attempt on the part of France to create an inter-conference body to be located, of course, in France. The French proposal was voted down. At the next ITU conference held in Vienna in 1868, it was decided that the French idea was good indeed, but the body was placed in neutral Switzerland, not in Imperial France (Coddington, 1952, p.23-24).

Some of the most blatant politics occurred in the ITU during the Cold War period. The U.S.S.R. regularly launched verbal attacks on the West, and the United States in particular. Any excuse was used, whether or not it was cloaked in respectability, such as the need for universality in the ITU which could only be met by the membership of the Mongolian People's Republic or Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and later by Mainland China. The U.S. would reply, and America's faithful allies would join in the counter-attack. Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Ukraine, and Beilorussia would then stand up for the U.S.S.R. When I was hired as a technical assistant by the ITU in 1949 for the Conference on European Broadcasting, I was told in a planning session of the Secretariat that for the first week all that would be needed was the large hall for the plenary meetings where the two major blocks could make their political speeches. We would not be needing committee rooms, where the real work would be done, until the politics was finished. I won't identify the parties, but I can claim to have helped dissuade a delegate from the West, who had had enough of the personal attacks against himself from some of his Communist colleagues, from inviting one of those delegates to meet him out in the street behind the old Palais des Congres to, in

his words, "decide the issue man to man." Yes, there have been politics in the ITU from the very beginning.

It must be admitted that the politics are different now. During the Cold War days, the United States knew the attacks were coming, was prepared to meet them and to counter-attack, and then, when the "crunch" came, they knew they had the votes to win. You can take a lot of abuse if you know for certain that in the end you will win.

2. THE NATURE OF THE ITU

Now let's take a look at the nature of the ITU and attempt to determine just what any majorities can realistically hope to attain. We will start with an obvious fact that the ITU is an international organization with all the strengths and weaknesses of this type of human endeavor. Basically, an international organization provides a meeting place for delegates of member nations for the discussion of common problems and for attempts to find a common solution. The output of an international organization takes the form of resolutions, recommendations, and draft treaties. In other words, none of the output of an international organization, which is directed to its members, is binding on those members without their agreement. The most serious of these forms, the draft treaty, must be ratified. In the case of the United States, this means the advice and consent of the Senate, two-thirds majority required, and the final ratification by the President. This is, of course, in sharp contrast with a decision of a government. A decision of the U.S. government is definitive at the point where the President issues a decree or signs an act of Congress. In the classical phrase, the outputs side of a national political system is "a definitive allocation of values." If it deals, for instance, with the regulation of behavior, you should regulate your behavior in accordance with that law because the state can use force to compel you to do it. In the case of the international organization, to the contrary, the members have a choice in whether or not they wish to be bound by its decisions - several choices in fact. They can decide not to participate in the meeting. They may decide not to sign a final document. They may decide to sign with reservations. They may refuse to ratify a treaty. They may ratify with reservations which can change the meaning of the decision of the conference for that member.

This is true of all international organizations including, with a slight difference, the United Nations, of which the ITU is a Specialized Agency. There should be no confusion whatsoever in our minds as to the nature of the beast; it is not, definitely not, a world government. International organizations are not a substitute for the sovereign na-

tion state; they are, to the contrary, creatures of nation states to permit them to do something in common without losing their sovereignties.

Let's be careful however. Despite the previous statement, international organizations, including the ITU, can make certain types of binding decisions. As a man-made or-organization with agreed rules and procedures, the members can make decisions which change the structure and functioning of the organization itself. For instance, a decision could be made to enlarge the Administrative Council, to hold a special conference, to refuse a delegate's credentials to a conference, or even to abolish the organization itself.

To recapitulate, international organizations as they are presently constituted cannot make decisions which can force a nation state to take an action against its will. If there is an action that is desired, like shifting air mobile service to another frequency band, it will not be binding on a nation state until that state agrees to the shift. This is both good and bad. If one has a majority of votes, it is frustrating if he cannot force the others to do what he wants done. That is human nature. However, if one is in a minority, it is nice to be able to refuse to carry out a plan of action if one seriously feels that it is against his best interests. Remember, the United States was in the majority situation for many, many years, and is just now finding itself at times in the minority.

3. RECENT CHANGES IN THE ITU'S ENVIRONMENT

All international organizations live in an environment made up of nation states. Any change in this environment will have an effect on international organizations. This is true of the ITU.

In a very rough categorization, there have been three major periods in the ITU's history. Prior to World War II, a group of Western nations, including the United States, tended to dominate the ITU. True, there were other members, including some states from Latin America, a few Asian nations, and even one or two from Africa, but the great majority were Western-oriented and they made the ITU do pretty much what they wanted it to do. The vast majority of members were of such a like mind on ITU matters that it was rarely necessary to bring matters to a vote. It was a sort of an English "old boys club."

The second period extends from World War II to about 1960. After World War II, the Old Boy's Club was invaded by a group of states with a different set of values, perhaps not as concerns the technology of telecommunications, but certainly as concerns politics. This is the Cold War period mentioned earlier in which a great deal of harsh, irritating

politics was brought into the work of the ITU. As also mentioned before, the intrusion of this new brand of politics might have been irritating, but the same old Western coalition, led quite often by the United States, always won out in the end.

The third period begins about 1960 and extends to the present. Starting even during World War II, a trickle of new nations began seeing the light of day--Lebanon in 1943, Syria and Iceland in 1944, Jordan and the Philippines in 1945, and India and Pakistan in 1947. Twenty-four new nations had achieved independence in the 16-year period between 1943 and 1959. In 1960 the trickle became a flood. Eighteen new states came into existence in 1960 alone. Forty-five new nations were born in the period 1960 to 1969. There have been a dozen since 1969.

Almost the first thing new nation states do is join the United Nations, and secondly they join the ITU and the Universal Postal Union. At the time of the Atlantic City Telecommunication Conference in 1947, the membership of the ITU was 78. By the Montreux Conference in 1965, it had grown to 125; and at Torremolinis, in 1973, it was up to 146. Membership in the ITU now is probably close to the 150 mark.

It must be emphasized that these nations are of a new breed. Almost all are former colonies of Western powers and almost all are extremely poor. They have little in the way of established institutions, natural resources, accumulated capital, or educated and skilled personnel, all of which are necessary for economic growth. Not only do they lack technology, but some are so poor that they simply cannot provide their populations with the basic necessities of clothing, food, and shelter.

Now let us turn to the impact that this latest change in the international environment is having on the ITU.

4. IMPACT OF CHANGE ON ITU

The recent change in the international environment is causing a fundamental modification to the ITU's structure and to its function. The exact extent of this change will not be known for some time, but one thing is certain: the good old days of Western domination of the ITU have ended.

The most obvious changes are those to the structure caused by the present size of membership. New techniques must be devised to organize conferences to carry out their tasks in a reasonable length of time. As the size of conferences grow, larger and more meeting rooms are necessary. Additional delegations mean reams of additional documents and expanded communications facilities. Modern-day large conferences demand a completely different approach from that

of pre-war times. More trained personnel are needed to service the conferences, both temporary and part time. All of this means more staff in Geneva and a constantly increasing ITU budget. In 1959, for instance, the ITU spent a grand total of 6,842,150 Swiss francs (Europa, 1960). In 1965 the amount increased to 19,877,100 (Europa, 1965), and in 1974 it was 56,794,600 (Europa, 1974). The Secretariat, for its part, was made up of 119 persons in 1959 (Europa, 1960), increasing to 176 in 1965 (Europa, 1965), and 383 in 1974 (Europa, 1974).

This desire on the part of the new nations to participate in ITU decisions carries over to the ITU Administrative Council. The purpose of the Council is to handle the business of the Union in the intervals between plenipotentiary conferences. It was supposed to be small enough to make decisions easily and quickly. The new states have demanded and received seats on the Administrative Council. It is a sad truth that, with organs of this kind, the addition of new members of a new region never means the reduction of representation of other regions. Consequently they only grow. The Atlantic City Telecommunication Conference set the size of the original Council at a modest 18. The Montreux Conference of 1965 raised it to 29, and the Torremolinos Conference of 1973 raised it to its present 36. It is interesting to note that the ITU had only 20 members when it started out in 1865, and at the turn of the century still had only 38. Today's Administrative Council meetings are as big as many of the early plenipotentiary conferences.

All of these changes of size demand new expertise and more money, but the expertise can be found as can the additional money without too much difficulty. The new politics that these new countries have brought into the ITU is more difficult to contend with, and I would like to concentrate on it now.

The new members of the ITU, especially those who became members since the late 1950's, have brought with them new national concerns and priorities which have resulted in new demands on the organization. The first of these priorities is to improve the lot of these people. This has been translated on the international scene into the word "development." The Third World countries take every opportunity they can in international conferences and meetings to request developmental aid, and the ITU is no exception. The beginnings of these new politics were evident on a number of occasions at the Montreux Conference in 1965, especially when the Third World countries proposed the establishment of a special ITU Technical Assistance Fund, over and above that which is provided in the United Nations Development Fund. This proposal was defeated at Montreux, but was reintroduced and approved at Torremolinos despite an announcement by the

U.S. that it would refuse to contribute to it (Beam et al, 1973, p. 43). Others approved at Torremolinos include Resolution No. 17, Improvement of Union Facilities for rendering Technical Assistance to Developing Countries; Resolution No. 18, Application of Science and Technology in the Interest of Developing Countries; Resolution No. 19, Special Measures for the least-developed Countries; and Opinion No. 2, entitled Favourable Treatment for Developing Countries (ITU, 1973). It was also responsible for the unsuccessful attempt on the part of these same countries to have the ITU adopt the United Nations contributory scheme, a move which would have raised the U.S. contribution to the work of the ITU to 25% and lower the contributions of the developing nations.

There is another related matter that is potentially much more dangerous to the interests of the advanced countries, and that is what we can describe as an "our share philosophy." This surfaced most recently in the World Maritime Administrative Conference in Geneva in the Spring of 1974. At that meeting, a group of 40 countries from the Middle East, Africa, and South America demanded that the frequency allotment table for the coastal radio-telephone band be changed to reflect the "future" needs of all states, including the developing nations, rather than the actual usage which benefits primarily the major maritime powers (Lee, 1974, p. 3-5). This is not a new idea, having surfaced on a number of other occasions since World War II. One may recall that this idea of grabbing a "future" share in the frequency spectrum was the reason for the failure of the Provisional Frequency Board in the late 1940's (Coddington, 1952, p. 357). Nevertheless, it can be a serious problem for the developed countries, the ones who are presently using the lion's share of frequencies in many parts of the spectrum. (This, in fact, was the main reason for Commissioner Lee's outburst that was mentioned in the introduction.)

The new nations have also brought with them a politics of "style," if you wish, and a politics of "expediency," both of which the West finds very irritating. The politics of style we can designate as the political baggage which the new nation brings with it into the international arena when it is born. Almost without exception, the new nations of the world were at one time colonies of western nations. And, almost without exception, whether they actually had to fight for independence or not, they have adopted the battle cry of "anti-colonialism" and usually will vote unanimously on the side of any issue which can be identified, sometimes accurately and sometimes not so accurately, as anti-colonialist. Thus you will find much of the third world enthusiastic supporters of Torremolinos Resolutions 30 and 31, which excluded Portugal and South Africa from the conference

and from all future conferences and meetings of the ITU. (The Portuguese part, by the way, has been rescinded.)

This type of politics was also responsible for the decision at Torremolinos to eliminate the territory class of membership, even though it resulted in the raising of the amount of contributions of the developing nations themselves. Briefly, since very early in the history of the ITU, the colonial powers all had gained additional memberships, and thus votes, for their various dependent territories. At one time France, for instance, had five. By 1973 only five countries still had such memberships: Spain, Portugal, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom. An early attempt at Torremolinos to eliminate the Portuguese and Spanish dependent territory memberships ended in a clean sweep. But, since each of these countries paid an additional contribution for its territories, the action raised the cost of the ITU to the new countries because everyone else had to make up for the consequent loss in revenue (Beam, et al, 1973, p. 10).

As regards the politics of expediency, if the developing nations wish to attain any of their avowed goals in an organization with the membership configuration such as that of the ITU, it is necessary for them to find allies. Thus an African group that wishes to obtain development aid must turn to other groups such as Latin America and, as if often the case, the Arab states of the Middle East. It is not unheard of in politics for one group to extract payment for its support of another group. So it is with international politics. This might well be the reason why you find African nations or Latin American nations supporting attacks on Israel initiated by the Arab states. This has occurred in a number of international organizations, including the ITU. So far it has not resulted in the expulsion of Israel from a conference; but Israel was subjected to several embarrassments at Torremolinos, including Resolution 48, which accused Israel of deliberately destroying two submarine cables in her part of the Mediterranean. This need might also be the reason for third world support for the participation of "liberation groups" in ITU conferences.

It is this new politics, including the politics of development, which has led a number of Americans to question the continued usefulness of a number of international organizations, including the ITU. Let us now turn to a discussion of what should be done.

5. TOWARD A NEW STRATEGY

The first and foremost issue that we must address is whether the ITU performs a function of real value to the United States and the rest of the world, even with the in-

jection of new politics. In other words, is it of enough value for the United States to expend the effort necessary to adapt to the changing nature of the ITU?

Article 4 of the Torremolinos International Telecommunication Convention is entitled "Purposes of the Union," and paragraph two outlines the basic tasks of the ITU. Four of these stand out and, in my opinion, provide an affirmative answer to our question. The ITU performs an indispensable task in allocating the radio frequency spectrum to various telecommunication services, it performs an essential task in the adoption of measures for the safety of life, it performs a necessary task in registering frequencies, and it performs a valuable task in bringing together telecommunications experts to work together to solve common problems and, in general, to share their expertise. In this latter category I am referring especially to the work of the CCIR and the CCITT, both of which have excellent reputations. There are a number of other functions of the ITU which have a value to the United States, but these four alone make the ITU worth keeping.

If this conclusion is accepted, then our task is to work out a strategy which could make the United States once again an effective force in the conferences and meetings of the ITU. Before proceeding to work on this strategy, I would like to point out that both Commissioner Lee and the American delegation to the Torremolinos Conference came to this same conclusion, despite the fact that they did discuss alternatives, which included withdrawal.

The first prerequisite is a change in attitude. American delegates to international conferences must be made aware of the fact that they and the rest of the industrial west are now in the minority, and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. As stated by Daniel P. Moynihan, Ambassador to the United Nations: "We are witnessing the emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the countries of the Third World. This order is already too much too developed for the United States or any other nation to think of opting out. It can't be done. One may become a delinquent in this nascent world society. An outcast in it. But one remains 'in' it" (Moynihan, 1975).

Once that is firmly in mind, it should be impressed on American delegates that the situation is not one in which the United States is necessarily the loser. The world, especially the Third World countries, has a need for American telecommunication technology. When the United States has something valid to offer in ITU conferences, her voice will be listened to as it has in the past. At times our point of view will win out, but there will be other times when it will lose. Perhaps even more important, the developing countries themselves might have something valid to offer to

the U.S. and the world in general. The new and poor nations should be treated not as enemies, or only nuisances, but as partners in a global enterprise who have both legitimate needs and valid contributions to make. As stated so admirably by Ambassador Scali, former U.S. Representative to the United Nations, "...we can seek to lead--not as the sole headquarters of justice and wisdom, but as one who recognizes that new and existing doors can be opened by many countries in an increasingly interdependent world" (Department of State, 1975).

In a moment I would like to turn to some practical steps that the United States can take to improve its position in the conferences and meetings of the ITU which are scheduled for the next few years, steps which might help to make U.S. delegates more effective and perhaps a little more comfortable in their new roles. Before I do, however, I would like to suggest that we take our time in evolving any firm, overall strategy. At present we are too new at the game, we have not had any prior experience, and there does not seem to be anywhere else we can go to take lessons. Probably the closest example one could find would be the Soviet Union's experience during the Cold War days, but there is enough difference between American and Russian policy objective to put the validity of any such lessons in serious doubt. In any case, a premature strategy can be worse than no strategy at all.

And now to the suggestions. The first one I would like to make is that the United States reverse its negative position as concerns bringing the politics of development into the ITU. I believe it is clear that there is no way that we can avoid this trend, and possibly no way to confine it to the United Nations, where we would like to see it concentrated. We should instead lend a sympathetic ear to the requests of the new nations and do what we feel we can to help them in their endeavors. For instance, the United States should make an immediate contribution to the ITU technical assistance fund. The exact size of the contribution is not as important as is the gesture. If nothing else, we could offer the amount of money that the Third World States saved us when they eliminated the membership for the United States Territories. Such a gesture is essential and basic.

Along similar lines, I would suggest that the role of the Consultative Committees in development be expanded and an attempt should be made to bring the developing countries to the CCITT and the CCIR. As Ernie Smith's study shows*,

*Smith, Ernest K. (1972), "The International Consultative Committee (CCIR), Its background, current activities, and some thoughts as to its future", unpublished report, OT/ITS, Department of Commerce, October 15, 1972.

these countries are not participating in the work of the Committees as much as they probably should. A serious attempt should be made to encourage their participation. Further thought should also be given to the possibility of holding the plenary meetings of the Consultative Committees in places other than Geneva. If we cannot bring the developing countries to the Consultative Committees, let us take the Consultative Committees to the developing countries.

If the second part of this suggestion is actually too expensive to be practical, as some say it would be, I would recommend the creation of small teams of telecommunication CCIR and CCITT experts from the technologically advanced nations to be made available to the developing nations, without cost, to hold seminars on various aspects of telecommunications and its application to development or even to help them to solve specific telecommunications problems. Each nation which provides an expert would cover the costs of doing so, including transportation and salary. Administrations could reward experts for spending a year, or even a month, in the field by considering such individuals for a raise in pay or even a promotion in rank. The success of the IFRB seminars demonstrates that this approach would be an extremely useful one.

As regards strategy, extreme care should be exercised in the preparation for future ITU conferences and meetings. I understand that the OTP is hard at work planning the American position for the 1979 WARC from the point of view of government needs and uses, and the FCC is doing the same for the non-governmental sector. This, of course, is necessary, but it is not enough. The United States should be making contact with other major users of radio communications in order to formulate a common position. This is where U.S. membership in an expanded European telecommunications group, C.E.P.T., as advocated by Commissioner Lee, might be a worthwhile step. By itself it would be inadequate, however. Even with the addition of the United States and Japan, for instance, the Western group would still be in a small minority. Attempts must be made to make contact with countries from the developing world, not only South America, but also Africa and Asia, in order to explain the American position and to obtain their reaction to it. No matter how valid a Western proposal may be, it must receive majority support to be adopted. Such a majority will be difficult to obtain in a climate of suspicion and distrust unless it can be accommodated to the needs and desires of the developing world.

In line with this, it is also time, in the words of Commissioner Lee, to "improve our political knowledge of telecommunications" (Lee, 1974, p. 12). For too long, international organization affairs have had a low priority

in our government, including the Department of State. Since the nations of the Third World have chosen international organizations as one of the primary arenas for the exercise of their foreign policy the United States will be handicapped if this situation continues. The scientist and the technician should not be expected to be an expert in international relations. The State Department must provide delegates to ITU conferences with the information they need. Not the hundreds of nit-picking instructions all signed by Kissinger that Senator Percy has complained of (Boulder Daily Camera, 1975), but good sound basic advice concerning the problems that can be expected and some alternative positions that can be taken if those problems do arise.

This reminds me of the story told by Professor Philip C. Jessup, one of our great international statesmen, about Secretary Morgenthau at the 1944 Breton Woods Conference. It seems that it was once the practice of the State Department to prepare a scenario for high officials who had to preside at conferences which signaled what the official was supposed to say and to alert him to the role of another actor. At one point the scenario for Secretary Morgenthau was like this: "Secretary Morgenthau: I call upon the Representative of Australia," In parentheses beneath it stated: (The Representative of Australia will arise and move a vote of thanks to the United States.) The Secretary was nearsighted and proceeded to read: "I call upon the Representative of Australia. The Representative of Australia will arise and move a vote of thanks to the United States" (Jessup, 1974).

One final suggestion. If we are going to adapt successfully to the new circumstances, we must above all have information. We must have information about the genuine needs and desires of other countries, about the things we do that other countries feel are valuable contributions to the work of the ITU and those that they feel are not, and in general about what can make U.S. delegations effective in the work of the ITU. The best source of this information is the delegates themselves. I would like to suggest that a greater effort be made to tap the information that our delegates take away from international conferences. A formal report by "the delegation" is useful, but too often tends to be self-serving and too general. Compile an official, formal report if necessary, but at the same time encourage each delegate--State Department official, Commerce Department official, FCC official, or representative of private enterprise--to put down on paper his evaluation of the work of the delegation and the conference as a whole, including his impression of where the U.S. delegation was effective and where it was not. This information should be stored and made available to delegates to succeeding conferences and to

academic researchers. This could be an invaluable tool in the creation of a successful future U.S. strategy.

In conclusion there is little else to say except that the world has changed, and the ITU along with it. The ITU is now dominated by countries of the Third World with new politics, most of which revolves around the desire for development. The United States is in a minority position in the ITU for the first time in history. Since the ITU still carries out functions that are important to the United States, as well as the rest of the world, we cannot just opt out. The United States must adopt a strategy which will permit the U.S. to continue to play a positive role, commensurate with its telecommunications technology, in the conferences and meetings of the ITU. Such a strategy will not and should not come quickly, but there are places where we can make a start. And start we must.

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